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Abstract 
 
Chase and Simon’s (1973) chunking theory of expert memory, which emphasizes the role of 
pattern recognition in problem solving, has attracted much attention in cognitive psychology.  
Holding (1992) advanced a series of criticisms that, taken together, purported to refute the 
theory.  Two valid criticisms—that chunk size and LTM encoding were underestimated—
are dealt with by a simple extension of the theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a).  The remainder 
of Holding’s criticisms either are not empirically founded or are based on a 
misunderstanding of the chunking theory and its role in a comprehensive theory of skill.  
Holding’s alternative SEEK theory, which emphasizes the role of search, lacks key 
mechanisms that could be implemented by the type of pattern recognition proposed by 
Chase and Simon (1973).   
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Pattern Recognition Makes Search Possible: 
Comments on Holding (1992) 
 
 Chase and Simon’s (1973) chunking theory of expert perception,  memory and 
problem solving (CT) has received, and continues to receive, considerable attention in 
cognitive psychology (e.g., Charness, 1992).  In his book The psychology of chess skill 
(1985), and later in his paper Theories of chess skill (1992), Holding systematically 
criticized CT as an explanation for chess skill in particular and for expertise in general, and 
proposed instead the SEEK (SEarch, Evaluation, Knowledge) theory.  Because of the 
importance of the chunking theory, a systematic review of Holding’s main criticisms is 
warranted.  After briefly presenting CT and SEEK, we shall argue that most of Holding’s 
points are due to a misunderstanding of CT or are refuted by empirical evidence.  As a 
consequence, CT fares better than suggested by Holding, and is substantially more valid and 
powerful than Holding’s own theory, which was never formulated in precise operational 
terms.   
The Chunking (CT) and SEEK Theories 
 This paper will focus on Holding’s 1992 article, which nicely summarized the key 
arguments of his book.  Holding (1992) described Chase and Simon’s chunking theory, 
which he calls “recognition-association theory” as follows: 
 
 “[The chunking theory] arose from the belief that differences in forward search 
could be discounted.  Instead, the theory suggests that chess skill depends on 
memory of specific patterns of pieces on the board.  Essentially, grandmasters are 
stronger because they know more patterns.” (p. 10) 
 
 and 
 
 “In more details, the recognition-association theory makes the assumption that 
chess mastery stems from knowing thousands of chess patterns.  Recog
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one of these patterns during play is said to trigger the memory of an associated 
plausible move, which may then be selected or investigated by the player.  Hence, 
chess skill depends on memory.” (p. 10) 
 
 Holding also mentioned computer simulations carried out by Simon and Gilmartin 
(1973), which led to the estimate that it takes at least 50,000 chunks to produce a recall 
performance close to that of a master, and contested this estimate as too large.   
 Holding’s rendition of the CT account of expert chess memory is essentially correct, 
although it is sketchy—for example, it says nothing about the links between CT and EPAM 
(Feigenbaum & Simon, 1984; Simon & Gilmartin, 1973), which add important information 
processing constraints, such as limits on the learning rate (about 8 s per chunk) and on the 
storage capacity of short-term memory (around seven chunks).   
 Holding was wrong, however, in asserting that Chase and Simon claimed that 
forward search could be discounted in the explanation of chess skill.   The principal claims 
of the CT theory are (1) that the superiority of strong over weak chess players in memory for 
briefly presented chess positions and sequences of moves depends on evoking from memory 
previously learned, and consequently familiar, patterns (chunks) of pieces; and (2) that these 
same perceptual chunks also play a central role in guiding the forward search used to 
discover and evaluate moves and in retaining information gathered in the course of this 
search.  
 Specifically, the relation between perceptual chunks in memory and forward search 
is discussed explicitly by Chase and Simon (1973, pp. 268-272), and they assert both that 
  
 “When the master is staring at a chessboard trying to choose his next 
move, he is engaged in a forward search through some kind of problem 
space,”  and that 
  
 “When the move is made in the mind’s eye—that is, when the internal 
representation of the position is updated—the result is then passed back 
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through the pattern perception system and new patterns are perceived.  These 
patterns in turn will suggest new moves, and the search continues.” 
    
 These passages, and the discussion surrounding them, can hardly be described as 
discounting the role of search in chess skill.   They do distinctly emphasize the importance 
of chess memory, and the associated perception, in carrying out such search expertly. We 
will have more to say about them later.    
 
 As an alternative and better theoretical explanation of chess skill, Holding proposed 
the SEEK theory, which emphasizes the role of search, evaluation, and knowledge.  SEEK 
maintains that the choice of a move is based on search and on evaluation, both guided by 
general, and not chunk-specific, knowledge.  Holding (1985, 1992) hardly specified his 
theory in more detail. For example, he did not indicate the type of data structures underlying 
“general knowledge” or give time parameters for the rate of searching and learning.   
Holding’s Criticisms of the Chunking Theory: A Reanalysis 
 As Holding’s criticisms of CT have been frequently cited, it is worth reviewing them 
in detail.  The data adduced in his 1992 paper, which summarizes the list of about forty 
contrary findings reported in Holding (1985), may be grouped into two main categories: 
empirical evidence on memory, and empirical evidence on problem solving.  We will 
discuss them in turn.   
Empirical Evidence on Memory 
 Holding proposed five sets of data as offering negative evidence for the chunking 
theory: (a) encoding into LTM is faster than proposed by the chunking theory; (b) the size of 
chunks is too small to reflect conceptual knowledge; (c) memory for random positions 
sometimes shows skill differences; (d) the number of 50,000 chunks necessary for expertise 
is inflated;  and (e) verbal knowledge and processing, neglected by the chunking theory, is 
important.   
  The first criticism, backed for example by experiments showing that interpolated 
tasks reduce recall performance minimally (Charness, 1976; Frey & Adesman, 1976) is one 
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of the Holding’s soundest.  There is also substantial merit in the second point:  that Chase 
and Simon underestimated the size of chunks (they proposed that the largest chunks would 
contain at most six or seven pieces), making it difficult to explain the high-level, conceptual 
knowledge shown by masters (e.g., De Groot, 1946/1978; Freyhoff, Gruber & Ziegler, 
1992).  A recent replication and extension of Chase and Simon’s experiment, carried out 
with a computer presentation of positions instead of a standard chess set, shows that chunks 
can be much larger with masters and grandmasters: up to seventeen pieces, on average 
(Gobet & Simon, in press).   
 These two weaknesses in the original chunking theory have led recently to an 
extension of the theory (Gobet & Simon, 1996a) that does not impose a limit on the size of 
chunks, thus removing criticism (b), and proposes that chunks that recur often evolve into 
more complex structures, called templates.  Templates have positions for variables (slots), 
which allow values to be encoded and stored rapidly, hence account for the rapid LTM 
storage showed by chess players and remove criticism (a).   
 Criticism (c), backed for example by Goldin’s (1979) recognition experiments, loses 
much of its significance now that it has been shown that CT (correctly) predicts a (small) 
skill difference in the recall  of random chess positions (Gobet & Simon, 1996b; Gobet & 
Simon, 1996c).  Criticism (d) addresses Simon and Gilmartin’s (1973) estimate that it takes 
from 10,000 to 100,000 chunks to reach expertise in chess and in any complex domain.  
Holding proposed that this number can be greatly reduced if chunks encode relations 
between pieces but not the exact location of pieces, so that the same chunk can represent 
constellations of pieces that have been shifted on the board.  Saariluoma (1994) and Gobet 
and Simon (1996b), have recently shown that chunks do encode information about the 
location of pieces, and that, as a consequence, Simon and Gilmartin’s estimate is not 
inflated.   
  Finally, referring to data from Pfau and Murphy (1988) and Holding (1989), 
Holding proposed (e) that verbal knowledge and processing may play an important role in 
chess, contrary to the chunking theory’s emphasis on visual memory.  With respect to verbal 
knowledge, CT does not deny its role, but offers perceptual mechanisms to explain how it 
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can be accessed (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973, p. 261).  With respect to verbal processing, 
recent experiments using Baddeley’s (1986) suppression techniques clearly show that tasks 
that suppress the visuo-spatial sketchpad and tasks that suppress the central executive do 
impair performance in chess recall or problem solving, but that articulatory tasks without 
such suppression do not (Robbins et al., 1995; Saariluoma, 1991; Saariluoma, 1992).  
(Holding himself, 1992, p. 13, correctly noted that the task of counting backwards, used in 
Holding (1989) as a way of interfering with verbal processing, also suppressed what 
corresponds to the central executive in Baddeley’s terminology.)  The results of these 
experiments clearly show that verbal processing is not essential in chess memory and 
thinking.   
 In summary, Holding was correct on two counts (role of LTM and size of chunks) 
and wrong on three.  The two weaknesses of CT correctly identified by Holding have been 
removed by the revision of the theory proposed by Gobet and Simon (1996a).   
Empirical Evidence on Problem Solving 
 As a chess player’s main occupation is not to perform memory experiments but to 
play chess, it is important to address the role of chunks when the task is to choose a move.  
This brings us to the second set of Holding’s criticisms.  With respect to problem solving, 
Holding challenged CT on the grounds that (a) most chess patterns consist of pawns,1 and 
pawn structures do not generate many moves; (b) most chess patterns found by Chase and 
Simon (1973) are too small to provide useful information; (c) pattern recognition is not 
sufficient to explain chess skill, because it applies only to the initial moves from the 
stimulus position and does not take look-ahead analysis into account; (d) strong players 
search much deeper and wider in the tree search than was suggested by De Groot (1946) or 
is predicted by CT; and (e) that the production-system explanation proposed by CT has 
never been validated.   
 The claim (a) that few moves are evoked by pawn structures, is refuted by the 
significance that chess players attach to pawns.  Their importance was recognized already in 
the eighteenth century by Philidor (1749), who stated that “Pawns are the soul of chess.” 
Whole books (e.g., Euwe, 1972; Kmoch, 1980) analyze the proper way to handle pawns and 
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describe typical pawn structures.  Pawn structures provide information about the squares on 
which pieces should be placed (e.g., a Knight in front of an isolated pawn) and also typical 
pawn moves for given structures.  Players, while thinking aloud, frequently comment on 
pawn structures and on moves relevant to them in problem solving tasks (see De Groot, 
1946) and even in memory tasks (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Gobet, 1993).   
 The claim (b) that chunks are too small to generate useful information (Chase and 
Simon hypothesized chunks of at most six or seven pieces) may have some truth, although 
even small chunks can suggest good moves in tactical situations, and chunks or small 
constellations of them allow recognition of positions of particular types.  Moreover, as was 
claimed by Holding (see above), Chase and Simon probably underestimated chunk size, 
especially for masters.  Removal of an artifact from their experiments -- limitation of chunk 
size by size of handgrasp -- has provided new, substantially larger, estimates.  Large chunks 
(templates) play an essential role in the revised theory.  
 The claim (c) rests on a misunderstanding of the chunking theory.  Holding states 
that “[...] the basic assumption of the pattern-move theory [is] that the better players derive 
their advantage simply from considering the better base moves suggested by familiar 
patterns” (Holding, 1985, p. 248), where “base moves” are moves playable in the stimulus 
position.  On the contrary, as we already noted above, Chase and Simon (1973) stated 
explicitly that recognition of patterns is used not only to generate base moves but also 
subsequent moves triggered by patterns in the “mind’s eye” at deeper levels during search. 
 A study by Holding and Reynolds (1982) is often cited as evidence against the 
recognition association theory.  In their study, the skill of players (from novices to experts) 
did not correlate with the recall of random positions2 shown for a few seconds, but 
effectiveness of the search for the best move in these positions did correlate with skill.  
However, because pattern recognition is applied recursively during look-ahead, a memory 
test only on the initial problem position does not really address the recognition-association 
assumption.   
 With respect to Holding’s claim (d), recent empirical data support the contention that 
stronger chess players search slightly deeper, on average, than weaker players (Charness, 
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1981; Gobet, in press; Saariluoma, 1990), but not that they search wider.  It is, however, 
unclear to what extent the differences in average depth of search refute the chunking 
hypothesis: the differences are small, and the formal model described in Gobet (1997) shows 
that CT also predicts that strong players have a higher ability to search, even if they may not 
need to do so in most cases.  Data reported by Chase and Simon (1973), showing that strong 
players also acquire longer chunks of move sequences when recalling games, would also 
predict, on the basis of the chunking mechanism, that they have information that enables 
them to search more deeply than weaker players.   
 Finally, Holding claims (e) that the production system account adduced by CT has 
never been validated.  (Chase and Simon, 1973, proposed that chunks act as conditions of 
productions (condition --> action rules) which trigger moves upon recognition.)  However, 
there is now a large body of empirical evidence supporting such a mechanism.  For example, 
Saariluoma (1990) has shown that players tend to choose deeper stereotyped solutions in 
problems where shallower but uncommon solutions are present.  (Depth is the number of 
moves to reach mate).  
 In addition, De Groot (1946) found that chess masters access information about 
adequate plans and position evaluation very rapidly—according to De Groot (1946), masters 
literally “see” the next move.  No search, no application of an evaluation function is needed 
for a first approximation, and this automatic process is sufficient to play a reasonable game 
in speed chess or simultaneous games against weaker players (Calderwood, Klein & 
Crandall, 1988; Gobet & Simon, 1996d).  Of course, playing a game at a professional level 
requires more than a first approximation and asks for search and subtle evaluations of the 
positions reached during this search.    
 CT concretely specifies the recognition mechanisms that are lacking in SEEK’s 
account of chess skill.  For example, in explaining the ability of masters to play speed chess 
at a high level, Holding (1992) proposed that they identify a goal rapidly and then search 
around this goal selectively. However, he provided no mechanism to explain how goals are 
identified rapidly in the first place, or what the basis is for selectivity in search.  SEEK, with 
its emphasis on search and generality of knowledge, has difficulties explaining the speed 
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with which masters “see” key aspects of a position and provides no mechanisms to account 
for the rapid instantiation of prototypes and other general knowledge.   
 In summary, none of Holding’s claims on problem-solving offer evidence against the 
chunking theory.  In addition, SEEK lacks explanatory power, as no mechanism is provided 
for carrying out the actions attributed to it.   
Conclusion 
 In the summary of his paper, Holding (1992, p. 10) stated that “there is not direct 
support for the [chunking] theory, which omits forward search for reasons that are 
reexamined.” This statement is incorrect on two counts.  First, as we have shown here, a 
large amount of data supports the chunking theory, contrary to Holding’s claim.  Second, CT 
does not  omit forward search nor deny its central importance for expert play in chess.  
Instead, it provides a mechanism—pattern recognition—that explains how selective forward 
search (including position evaluation) can be carried out.  As mentioned above, pattern 
recognition occurs not only in the position on the board, but also in the various positions met 
during forward search.   
 Although often incorrect, Holding’s (1985, 1992) criticisms have been fruitful in 
stimulating new empirical research that has brought about refinement of the chunking 
theory.  In particular, Holding was correct in noting that the chunk size postulated by CT 
was too small, and that CT did not provide mechanisms allowing a rapid encoding into 
LTM.  However, Holding’s own theory, SEEK, offered only a general sketch, in itself not 
incompatible with the chunking theory, but insufficiently specified to make precise 
predictions.   
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Footnotes 
 
 
1Chess players differentiate between pawns, the weakest men and the remaining pieces 
(king, queen, rook, bishop and knight). 
2A problem with this study is that the positions are not completely random.  First, some 
(semantic) constraints were applied in generating the positions used by Holding and 
Reynolds (1992).  Second, a statistical analysis shows that equiprobability of White and 
Black pieces’ distribution on the board may be rejected at p<.001 (Gobet, 1993).  Therefore, 
the findings of this study are hard to interpret. 
